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ALASKA'S MENS REA REQUIREMENTS
FOR STATUTORY RAPE
I. INTRODUCTION
The prosecution of statutory rape' often brings states' interests and
defendants' due process rights into conflict. States traditionally cite their
strong interest in protecting minors as the basis for allowing convictions of
statutory rape without proof of a defendant's purposeful, knowing, reckless,
or even negligent state of mind as to the victim's age.2 Of the few states
that allow a defense involving the defendant's belief of the victim's age,
most require that the defendant establish a lack of criminal intent rather
than force the prosecution to prove its existence.3
This failure to demand proof of a culpable mental state conflicts with
due process ideals requiring both that defendants possess some level of
fault for criminal convictions and that the prosecution overcome a
presumption of innocence by proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Alaska Supreme Court, interpreting the due process clause of the
Alaska Constitution, has accentuated this conflict in a number of opinions.
The combined effect of those decisions calls into question the
constitutionality of recent Alaska statutory rape legislation.
This note will demonstrate that substantive due process under the
Alaska Constitution requires a mens rea element for statutory rape In
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1. In Alaska, acts commonly referred to as "statutory rape" are classified as "sexual
abuse of a minor in the second degree." See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.436 (1989 & Supp.
1991).
2. See, e.g., People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52, 54 n.10 (Cal. 1984) ("The view that
mistake of age is not a defense to a charge of statutory rape still prevails in the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions.").
3. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249, 251 (N.M. 1990) (holding that while
knowledge of age is not an element of the offense of statutory rape, a defendant may
present a reasonable mistake of fact defense); State v. Smith, 576 P.2d 1110, 1111 (Mont.
978) (referring to the Montana Criminal Code in recognizing a belief of age defense for
which the defendant has the burden of proof and acknowledging similar statutory defenses
in Washington and Kentucky); People v. Keegan, 286 N.E.2d 345, 346 (11. 1971) (referring
to an Illinois statute creating the affirmative defense of a reasonable belief of age).
4. The due process issues that have arisen under Alaska law have not received
attention in the statutory rape literature. Despite a variety of scholarly articles addressing
both strict liability for crimes and the defense of reasonable belief of age in statutory rape
cases, commentators have failed to focus on the possibility that a mental state element may
be constitutionally required for statutory rape convictions.
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addition, procedural due process under both the Alaska and United States
Constitutions requires that the prosecution bear the burden of proving all
elements of the crime. If a mens rea element is required for the crime of
statutory rape, the prosecution must bear the burden of proving that mental
state. Currently, Alaska provides only an affirmative defense5 for a
defendant with a reasonable belief that the victim was over sixteen years
of age. In other words, Alaska has shifted the burden of disproving mens
rea to the defendant; the prosecution need not prove that the defendant had
a culpable mental state. This shift violates the due process requirements
of both the United States and Alaska Constitutions.
Before approaching this thesis, the note first provides some
background. Part II explains the statutory rape law in Alaska and its most
Frank Remington and Orrin Helstad describe the confused state of the law as it pertains
to crimes requiring a mental state and strict liability crimes. Frank Remington &Orrin
Helstad, The Mental Element in Crime -- A Legislative Problem, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 644(1952). They explain that courts have upheld strict criminal liability for violations of
regulations that are based on the state's police power to protect health, safety and welfare.
Id. at 670. In discussing "regulatory crimes," Remington and Helstad refer to offenses that
arise from social needs that are a product of the industrial revolution, such as the illegal sale
of liquor, impure food or drugs, misbranded articles, as well as nuisances and violations of
motor vehicle laws and traffic regulations. Id. However, they also recognize that strict
liability is sometimes extended to more serious crimes such as sex crimes committed against
persons below a certain age. Id.
Francis Sayre also discusses regulatory public welfare crimes as the general exception
to r criminal intent for crimes. Francis Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM.
L.' rV.55 (1933). Sayre warns against extending this exception: "Courts should
scrupulously avoid extending the doctrines applicable to public welfare offenses to true
crimes. To do o would sap the vitality of the criminal law." Id. at 84. He notes that
statutory rape cases allowing no mistake of fact defense are completely dissimilar to
ordinary regulatory offense cases because the former usually involve a substantial term of
imprisonment; the latter usually involve only a rather minor penalty. Id. at 73. Sayre does,
however, argue against a reasonable belief as to age defense because such a defense would
allow defendants to easily avoid punishment and would deprive victims of the protection
of the law. Id. at 74.
In contrast, Herbert Packer assesses criminal sanctions in the absence of a proven
mental state as inefficacious and unjust. Herbert Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court,
1962 SuP. Cr. RaV. 107, 109(1962). Such sanctions are inefficacious because punishment
for conduct absent the actor's awareness that the conduct was criminal does not deter future
similar behavior. In addition, the actor's incapacitation and/or reformation is not necessary
to protect society. Id. The injustice arises when the actor must suffer the stigma of a
criminal conviction without moral blameworthiness. This stigma is especially severe in the
case of a rape conviction. Id. But see Steven Nemerson, Note, Criminal Liability Without
Fault: A Philosophical Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1517 (1975) (arguing that for
certain rigidly circumscribed classes of offenses, imposing criminal liability without fault
or a culpable mental state is ethically justifiable and conforms with jurisprudential values).
Larry Myers specifically advocates a reasonable belief defense for statutory rape, but
does not address issues of burden of proof or constitutional requirements. Larry Myers,
Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 105(1965).
5. The term "affirmative defense" is used in this note to refer to a defense that must
be raised by the defendant, but does not necessarily have to be proved by the defendant.
In this context, the burden of proving the affmnative defense may be placed on either the
prosecution or the defense.
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recent interpretation by the Alaska courts. Part I surveys some of the
history of statutory rape law and the policies underlying it This survey
shows that requiring a culpable mental state as to the victim's age in
statutory rape cases is not unreasonable, unrealistic or contrary to public
policy. Part IV explores whether the United States Constitution requires
a mens rea element for serious crimes such as statutory rape, and whether
the prosecution must prove that element Part V argues that Alaska's due
process jurisprudence requires a culpable mental state or mens rea for
statutory rape, and that Alaska's affirmative defense of a reasonable belief
in the victim's age unconstitutionally shifts the burden of disproving mens
rea to the defendant Fmally, Part VI addresses various counter-arguments.
II. ALASKA'S STATUTORY RAPE LAW
Alaska currently categorizes acts commonly known as "statutory rape"
under the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree. Alaska
Statutes section 11.41.436 provides that:
(a) An offender commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in
the second degree if
(1) being 16 years of age or older, the offender engages in
sexual penetration with a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years of age
and at least three years younger than the offender ...
(2) being 16 years of age or older, the offender engages in
sexual contact with a person who is under 13 years of age ....
(b) Sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree is a class B
felony.!
However, when someone "16 years of age or older.., engages in sexual
penetration with a person who is under 13 years of age," the offense
committed is sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree and constitutes an
unclassified felony! Courts may sentence defendants convicted of second
degree sexual abuse of a minor to "a definite term of imprisonment of not
more than 10 years,"' and those convicted of first degree sexual abuse of
a minor to "a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 30 years."
The Alaska Legislature has confirmed that:
[W]henever... an offense depends upon a victim being under a certain
age, it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the alleged offense, the
defendant reasonably believed the victim to be that age or older, unless the
6. ALAsKA STAT. § 11A1.436 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
7. Id. § 11.41.434.
8. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d) (1990) (setting forth the sentence for class B
felonies).
9. Id. § 12.55.125(i).
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victim was under [thirteen] years of age at the time of the alleged
offense'
Because this affirmative defense does not apply if the minor is under
thirteen years old, it cannot serve to preclude a conviction for sexual abuse
of a minor in the first degree. In order to successfully raise the affirmative
defense, the defendant must present some evidence to place the defense in
issue, and must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence."
IH. THE DYNAMIC HISTORY OF STATUTORY RAPE LAW SUPPORTS
THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT
Historically, jurisdictions in the United States have disallowed any
reasonable mistake of age defense for statutory rape or sexual abuse-type
crimes. Even today, the majority of jurisdictions do not recognize a
mistake of age defense to a statutory rape charge. 3 States that do allow
such a defense usually place the burden of proof on the defendant rather
than the prosecution."4
It may seem illogical to assert that due process requires proof of a
culpable mental state for statutory rape when the majority of United States
jurisdictions do not allow even an affirmative defense to the crime.
Despite the fact that most of these jurisdictions preclude a mistake of age
defense, this section demonstrates that: (1) the states may have been
mistaken in adopting this position; (2) the policy arguments offered in
support of this position are no longer persuasive; and (3) several states now
require that a, mens rea element be proven by the state. In other words, the
argument that Alaska should require a culpable mental state for statutory
rape is not undermined by the positions taken by other American
jurisdictions.
10. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445 (1989).
11. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(1) (Supp. 1991); see also Jager v. State, 748 P.2d
1172 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the defendant bore the burden of proving the
"reasonable belief" affirmative defense).
12. Myers, supra note 4, at 105. See, e.g., State v. Stiffler, 788 P.2d 220 (Idaho 1990);
Commonwealth v. Dunne, 474 N.E.2d 538 (Mass. 1985); State v. Silva, 491 P.2d 1216
(Haw. 1971); State v. Vicars, 183 N.W.2d 241 (Neb. 1971).
13. People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52,54 n.10 (Cal. 1984); see also Silva, 491 P.2d at 1216(noting that since California became the first state to recognize a reasonable mistake of age
defense in People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964), several jurisdictions have
specifically rejected the Hernandez rationale).
14. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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A. Common Law
One scholar suggests that the near-consensus among American
jurisdictions of retaining strict liability for statutory rape cases may be the
product of misunderstanding.15 He notes that the definition of statutory
rape in a 1576 English statute served as part of the original common law
of the United States. 16 Under this statute, English courts allowed the
existence of a reasonable mistake of fact to serve as a defense. American
courts, however, rejected the defense, despite adopting the English
statute.
7
The American courts precluded the defense based upon an English
abduction case, Regina v. Prince.' In Regina, the court rejected an
honest and reasonable mistake of age defense to the criminal consequences
arising from the abduction of an unmarried and underage girl. Although
Regina was statutorily overruled ten years later, American jurisdictions
retained the preclusive effect upon the mistake of fact defense, and
extended it to all statutory rape cases. 9 Thus, the misunderstanding
resulted when, for a ten-year period, the English statutory rape law differed
in cases of abduction.o The fact that the statutory rape jurisprudence of
other jurisdictions differs only because of an erroneous reading of English
precedent supports Alaska's position as .one of the few states that allows
a defense based upon a defendant's reasonable mistake of age.
B. Policy Development
Over time, the policies originally espoused to justify strict liability for
statutory rape have become outdated and inapplicable. States have
historically used two theories to justify strict liability: "Lesser Legal
Wrong" and "Moral Wrong."2' The Lesser Legal Wrong Theory posits
that states rationalize the elimination of a mens rea element for statutory
rape or sexual abuse by transferring the intent to commit one crime to
another related crime, even if the related crime is more serious. In other
words, if fornication is a crime and the defendant has the required mens rea
for fornication (i.e., knowledge that he or she is having sex), that intent
15. Myers, supra note 4, at 110-11. Myers uses the "misunderstanding" idea in a
persuasive argument for the allowance of reasonable mistake of age defenses to statutory
rape.
16. Id. (citing Nider v. Commonwealth, 131 S.W. 1024, 1026 (Ky. 1910)).
17. Id.
18. L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875).
19. Myers, supra note 4, at 111.
20. Id. at 110-11.
21. Id. at 127.
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applies to all the legal consequences of the act of fornication.2 Naturally,
if the other participant in the sexual act is younger than the statutory age,
a charge of statutory rape or sexual abuse of a minor would be such a
consequence.
Similar reasoning provides the basis for the Moral Wrong Theory.
Even when non-marital sexual intercourse does not constitute a crime,
society often considers it immoral or wrong. Courts frequently have
transferred the intent to commit such immoral acts into the requisite mens
rea for unintended crimes associated with those immoral acts." Under this
theory, a mistake of fact defense would be rejected, since the mistake
applied only to the degree of the wrong rather than the presence of the
wrong.
Neither of these theories can continue to justify strict criminal liability
for statutory rape. First, most states no longer criminalize extramarital or
premarital sex; those that do often decline to enforce these offenses.O In
fact, the Alaska Supreme Court has explicitly noted that Alaska does not
consider sexual intercourse between consenting adults to be a crime 6 By
definition, transferring intent from one crime to another requires two
crimes. Since Alaska has decriminalized the lesser offense, the Lesser
Legal Wrong Theory is inapplicable.
Second, although courts have justified strict liability for statutory rape
on the Moral Wrong Theory7 that theory has lost its persuasiveness. The
logic underlying this theory is invalid. Immorality is not synonymous with
illegality; intent to do an immoral act does not necessarily entail some form
of criminal intent. Using immorality as the basis for inferring serious
criminal intent, especially when the accused is not even aware that the act
is criminal, seems unjustifiable and unfair.
In addition, the values and morals of society have evolved since this
theory was implemented in statutory rape jurisprudence. Advocates of the
notion that premarital or extramarital sexual intercourse is immoral can no
longer boast of a national mandate in support of their view. Events in
recent history such as the sexual revolution, the advent of the birth control
pill, and television advertisements for condoms evidence this change in
22. Id.
23. Id. at 128.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 127-28.
26. Guest v. State, 583 P.2d 836, 839-40 (Alaska 1978).
27. See Myers, supra note 4, at 127-28; see, e.g., People v. Ratz, 46 P. 915, 916 (Cal.
1896) (holding that the immoraity of the act of carnal knowledge with a minor necessitates
that the state refuse a reasonable belief of age defense for statutory rape), overruled by
People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 677 (Cal. 1964).
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public opinion. Even contemporary advocates of abstinence from sexual
intercourse focus their arguments more on the health risks associated with
extramarital intercourse than on questions of morality.
Finally, courts and commentators have recognized that extramarital sex
is not immoral under modem standards.2 For example, basing its
decisions in part on a newly recognized constitutional right to privacy, the
United States Supreme Court has confinmed the right of unmarried and
married people to use contraceptives29 and obtain abortions20 The Court
has, to a certain extent, extended these rights even to minors.31 Thus, the
Court has intimated that the right to engage in sexual intercourse is
constitutionally protected.
In sum, established statutory rape law seems ripe for change.
Transferred intent, the traditional substitute for requiring an awareness of
the age of the victim, is no longer sufficient for such purposes. Because
sexual intercourse between consenting unmarried adults is neither illegal
nor clearly considered to be immoral, the theories of Lesser Legal Wrong
and Moral Wrong do not support strict liability for statutory rape.
C. Other Jurisdictions
Changes in the statutory rape law of other jurisdictions have occurred
in two ways. Some states that now allow an affirmative defense for a
defendant with a reasonable belief that the victim was the age of consent'
place the burden of proving that belief on the defendant. However, a few
states require that the prosecution prove the mens rea element with respect
to the victim's age.
In State v. Elton,33 the Utah Supreme Court considered a statutory
rape statute similar to Alaska's sexual abuse of a minor statute. Under the
28. See People v. Hemandez, 393 P.2d 673, 677 (Cal. 1964) (noting that extramarital
sexual intercourse is not immoral); see also Myers, supra note 4, at 129. In comparing
statutory rape to bigamy, where a good faith reliance on a divorce or annulment is a
defense, the Hernande.z court declared that "[c]ertainly it cannot be a greater wrong to
entertain a bona fide but erroneous belief that a valid consent to an act of sexual intercourse
has been obtained." Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 677.
29. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that states could not
prohibit married couples from using contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (holding that the state could not interfere in the decision of an individual, married
or unmarried, to either procreate or use contraceptives).
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Although the viability of Roe remains in
doubt, most states will likely maintain some form of the right to obtain an abortion. The
ongoing and widely publicized abortion debate illustrates that no national consensus exists
on the issue.
31. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that a New York
law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors under 16 was unconstitutional).
32. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984).
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statute in question, sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen years of
age constituted a third degree felony?4 The court held that such unlawful
sexual intercourse was not a strict liability crime because the statute did not
expressly provide for strict liability.35 Absent strict liability, the state was
required to prove a mens rea element for every offense.3 6 On this basis,
the court concluded that "the prosecution must prove that the defendant
either was aware of the fact that the partner was underage or that the
defendant ought to have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that his partner was underage."37 Thus, Utah not only allows a mistake of
age defense, but also places the burden of proving mens rea on the
prosecution.
Illinois also requires that the prosecution prove at least negligence with
respect to the age of the victim in statutory rape cases. In People v.
Plewka, 3 the Illinois appellate court explained that a reasonable belief
that the victim was at least sixteen years old constituted an affirmative
defense to statutory rape.39 While Alaska's definition of an affirmative
defense burdens the defendant with proving the issue,4 the affirmative
defense used in Plewka requires that the defendant only raise the issue
by presenting some evidence, if the prosecution has not already done so.41
Once the issue has been raised, the prosecution must prove the defendant's
guilt concerning that issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
California has unquestionably recognized a reasonable belief of age
defense to statutory rape. Despite conflicting judicial opinions, California
courts have indicated that the prosecution bears the burden of proving this
issue. In the landmark case of People v. Hernandez,43 the California
Supreme Court departed from traditional statutory rape law and declared
that the charge could be defended by negating criminal intent through a
showing of reasonable belief that the victim was eighteen or older."
Although the court did not expressly discuss who should bear the burden
of proof, the case involved an offer of proof of reasonable belief by the
34. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401 (1990).
35. Elton, 680 P.2d at 729.
36. Id. at 729-30.
37. Id.
38. 327 N.E.2d 457 (1. App. Ct. 1975).
39. Id. at 459.
40. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
41. Plewka, 327 N.E.2d at 459 (citation omitted).
42. Id.
43. 393 P.I 673 (Cal. 1964).
44. Id. at 677.
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defendant; 5 possibly indicating that the court expected the accused to
convince the jury of his reasonable belief.
In People v. Winters,4 the California District Court of Appeal
interpreted Hernandez to "require[] the People, in a statutory rape case
if the defense of lack of criminal intent is raised, to prove that the
defendant did not have reasonable cause to believe that the victim was over
[eighteen] years of age." 47 This language appears to require that the
accused raise the issue of reasonable belief and that the prosecution bear
the burden of proving a lack of reasonable belief. A subsequent case
illustrates the disagreement in some California courts over the burden of
proof issue. In People v. Thomas,48 the majority, while not directly
addressing the burden of proof issue, cited Winters in declaring that a
defendant did not have to testify to utilize the reasonable belief defense.4 9
The dissent, however, asserted that this defense "is an affirmative defense
as to which the defendant has the burden of proof.'"' °
The background of statutory rape law in the United States demonstrates
that it is not unreasonable or unfounded to argue that Alaska should require
a mens rea element for sexual abuse of a minor. In fact, the reality that
most American jurisdictions do not include mens rea as an element of
statutory rape does nothing to cure the constitutional infirmities of that
practice in Alaska.
IV. MENS REA REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
A. Are Mens Rea Elements Required?5'
Morissette v. United States,52 decided in 1952, remains one of the
leading United States Supreme Court decisions on the acceptability of the
strict criminal liability standard. The Morissette Court emphatically
reiterated the longstanding rule requiring a mens rea element for crimes. 3
45. Id. at 678.
46. 51 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Cal. Dist Ct App. 1966).
47. Id. at 738.
48. 73 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968), overruled on other grounds by People v.
Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975).
49. Id. at 597.
50. Id. at 598 (Shoemaker, J., dissenting).
51. It is important to address the possibility that the federal constitution requires a mens
rea element for serious crimes such as statutory rape, or in Alaska's case, sexual abuse of
a minor in the second degree. If the federal constitutional requires mens rea, then Alaska
and other states must also require mens rea in order to abide by the federal constitution.
52. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
53. In a now famous passage, Justice Jackson declared:
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However, the Court specifically permitted an exception to this rule,
recognizing the propriety of strict liability for public welfare crimes or
regulatory offenses that arose from the industrial revolution and the need
to impose more stringent standards on particular industries and trades.-
Finding that the exception did not apply to the case at bar, the Morissette
Court inferred a mens rea element for the larceny statute in question."
Justice Jackson explained that due to the seriousness of the crime involved,
the mere omission of words indicating fault could not demonstrate
Congress' intent to impose strict liability. The Court noted that the crime
in question constituted a felony, would gravely besmirch the defendant's
reputation, and originated from a common law crime that required proof
of criminal intent. Thus, while approving the use of a strict liability
standard for ]public welfare crimes, the Court required proof of a culpable
mental state when society considers the crime serious and the crime has
historically included a mens rea element.
In United States v. Gypsum Co.,57 the Court construed and
elaborated on Morissette. After citing both Morissette and Lambert
v. Californid8 as examples in which it had read a mens rea element into
a statutory offense, the Court explained that Morissette established an
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between
some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the
child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational
basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place
of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution. Unqualified
acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth Century was
indicated by Blackstone's sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must
first be a "vicious will."
Id. at 250-51 (footnotes omitted).
54. Id. at 253-56.
55. Id. at 270-71.
56. See id. at 256, 260-63.
57. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
58. 355 U.S. 225 (1957). InLambert, the Court held that registration requirements for
convicted felons entering Los Angeles violated due process when applied to people who
were unaware of the duty to register, absent proof of a probability of such awareness. Id.
at 229-30. The Court based this awareness requirement on the concept that notice was
required in order to satisfy due process standards. Id. at 228. Despite this holding, the
Court acknowledged strict liability as a legitimate option in some areas by explaining that
"[tihere is wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of
knowledge and diligence from its definition." Id. The Court distinguished the failure to
register offense as passive conduct, "unlike the commission of acts ... under circumstances
that should alert the doer to the conseences of his deed." Id. (citing Chicago B & 0 Ry.
v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 578 (1911)). Notably, this distinction could be read to
require a "reasonable under the circumstances" standard. Under such a standard, due
process might require at least negligence for statutory rape. Nonetheless, the result in
Lambert failed to provide a definitive rule as to when strict liability violates due process.
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interpretive presumption that mens rea is required, at least for crimes with
a common law origin.59 This presumption assumes that Congress legislates
against a background of traditional legal concepts, which the legislature
may alter only explicitly.' The Court declared that "[while strict-liability
offenses are not unknown to the criminal law and do not invariably offend
constitutional requirements, . . . the limited circumstances in which
Congress has created and this Court has recognized such offenses... attest
to their generally disfavored status."6' Although this language adds little
apart from a further condemnation of strict liability in American
jurisprudence, it does suggest that many instances may exist in which strict
liability would "offend constitutional requirements."
The Supreme Court has not produced a definitive answer as to whether,
absent a mens rea requirement, strict liability for a serious crime such as
Alaska's second degree sexual abuse of a minor violates the United States
Constitution. Despite its approval of strict liability for many public welfare
crimes and its inference of a mens rea element in Morissette, the Court
has neither established specific guidelines for permitting strict liability, nor
has it delved deeply into the requirements of the United States Constitution.
Although it is unclear whether the Constitution prohibits strict liability for
statutory rape or sexual abuse of a minor, language in Gypsum indicates
that such preclusion may be a realistic possibility.
B. Who Bears the Burden of Proof?
If mens rea elements are constitutionally required, the prosecution must
bear the burden of proving those elements. In the In Re Winship62
decision, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held that the federal
Due Process Clause63 requires the prosecution to prove "beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
[the defendant] is charged."
Later Supreme Court cases affirmed and elaborated on the standard
promulgated in Winship. In Mullaney v. Wilbur,ss the Court resolved
the burden of proof issue in the context of a defendant seeking to reduce
a homicide charge to manslaughter by asserting that he acted in the heat of
59. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437.
60. Id. (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)).
61. Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
62. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
63. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o state
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. Winslip, 397 U.S. at 364.
65. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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passion on sudden provocation. The Court held that the Due Process
Clause requires that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation when the defendant
properly raises the issue in a homicide case.
The Mulfaney requirement that the prosecution prove the lack of heat
of passion is analogous to requiring proof of a lack of a reasonable belief
of age in the statutory rape context If the absence of such a belief
constitutes a fact necessary for second degree sexual abuse of a minor,
under Mullaney, federal due process would require that the prosecution
bear the burden of proof on that issue. In Mullaney, the Court concluded
that the requirement of proving a negative did not impose a hardship on the
prosecution so unique as to justify compelling the defendant to prove the
critical issue of criminal culpability.67
In Patterson v. New York,6" the Court, while upholding the
Winship rule, distinguished Mullaney and appeared to limit the reach of
Winship. The Court held that requiring the accused to prove the
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance
of the evidence in order to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter did
not violate the Due Process Clause.69 The Court reasoned that recognizing
mitigating circumstances through an affirmative defense did not require
that the state prove the non-existence of such circumstances whenever they
were put at issue.! The court distinguished Patterson from Mullaney
and Winship on the ground that the defense in question in Patterson did
not serve to negate any facts which the prosecution had to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt to constitute the crime!' The Court recognized a
balance in that the Due Process Clause demands that the prosecution prove
"all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the
defendant is charged," but not "the nonexistence of all affirmative
defenses."72
The central themes from Winship, Mullaney and Patterson
indicate that if the Constitution requires a mens rea element for statutory
rape, sexual abuse of a minor, or any other serious crime, the prosecution
66. Id. at 704.
67. Id. at 702.
68. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
69. Id. at 206-07.
70. Id. at 209.
71. The Patterson Court explained that in New York, the victim's death, the accused's
intent to kill and causation comprised the facts that the state needed to prove in order to
convict Patterson of murder. Id. at 205. However, malice or the absence of provocation
represented an additional fact necessary under the statute considered in Mullaney. Id. at
215-16.
72. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
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must bear the burden of proof as to that element. Alternatively, if a
statutory rape law contains no mens rea element but allows the collateral
defense of reasonable belief of age or lack of a culpable mental state, then
the federal Constitution does not prevent the state from placing the burden
of proof on the defendant on that issue.
V. MENS RBA REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION
A. Alaska May Extend Due Process Further Than Under the Federal
Constitution
Alaska can and has extended its own due process safeguards further
than the protections available under federal due process.73 This option
enables Alaska to interpret its own due process clause74 to require a mens
rea element for second degree sexual abuse, notwithstanding the
uncertainty concerning the demands of the United States Constitution. The
Alaska Supreme Court in State v. Rice, 5 confirmed the state's power to
interpret its own due process clause more expansively than that of the
United States Constitution. After recognizing the obligation to enforce
federal protections, the Rice court explained that:
[W]e also have a concomitant duty to develop constitutional rights under
the Alaska Constitution... "if we find such fundamental rights and
privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional
language and to be necessary for the kind of civilized life and ordered
liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heritage. We need not
stand by... waiting for constitutional direction from the highest court of
the land. Instead, we should be moving concurrently to develop and
expound the principles embedded in our constitutional law."76
The Rice court thus exercised its ability to extend Alaska's due process
guarantees:" The availability of greater due process protection under the
73. See supra Paul E. McGreal, A Tale of Two Courts: The United States Supreme
Court, The Alaska Supreme Court, and Retroactivity, 9 ALASKA L. REv. 305 (1992)
(discussing the propriety of the extension of a state's own constitutional guarantees beyond
those available under the United States Constitution).
74. The due process clause of the Alaska Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." ALASKA CONST. art.
L § 7.
75. 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981).
76. Id. at 112 (quoting Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970));
see also Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 1973) (declaring that in the context of
due process, Alaska is free to develop additionalrights and privileges under its constitution).
77. Rice involved a situation somewhat analogous to the issue in this note. The court
held that the forfeiture of an innocent security holder's interest did not violate federal
substantive due process, but that not allowing innocent security owners to show their lack
of involvement in criminal activity, and thereby avoid forfeiture, violated Alaska's due
process. Rice, 626 P.2d at 112-14.
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Alaska Constitution opens the door for Alaska to require a culpable mental
state as an element of second degree sexual abuse or statutory rape.
B. Alaska Jurisprudence Indicates that Due Process Requires Criminal
Intent for Serious Crimes
Alaska first considered the principle that due process requires mens rea
elements for certain crimes in Speidel v. State,8 Alex v. Stati and
Kimoktoak v. State.80 In Speidel, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed
a conviction for failure to return a rented automobile."1 The defendant
argued that because this crime constituted a felony, the statute was
unconstitutional for failing to require criminal intent.' The court observed
a "universal rule" that for conduct to become criminal, the accused must
have possessed an awareness of wrongdoing." Referring to Morissette
v. United States," the Speidel court also noted the "public welfare
offenses" exception to this rule.85 The court reasoned that the statute in
question did not represent a public welfare crime, as it focused on
protecting those in the business of renting cars, rather than on guarding the
health, safety and welfare of the public as a whole. The court found the
statute to be valid in that it criminalized the failure to return a rented car
with a purposeful intent to harm the vehicle's owner. However, the portion
of the statute that mandated a felony conviction for negligent failure to
return such a vehicle violated due process.Y In a unanimous opinion, the
court explained that "[to convict a person of a felony for such an act,
without proving criminal intent, is to deprive such person of due process
of law." 8 Not only did the Speidel court declare that criminal intent was
necessary for felony convictions, but the phrase "proving criminal intent"
indicates that the court also intended that the prosecution retain the burden
of proving mens rea.
In Alex v. State," the Alaska Supreme Court elaborated on the
principles discussed in SpeideL9" The court reaffirmed Speidel's holding
78. 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969).
79. 484 P2d 677 (Alaska 1971).
80. 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978).
81. Speidel, 460 P.2d at 78, 84.
82. Id. at 78.
83. Id.
84. 342 U.S. 246 (1952); see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
85. Speidel, 460 P.2d at 78.
86. Id. at 79.
87. Id. at 80-81.
88. Id. at 80.
89. 484 P.2d 677 (1971).
90. In Alex, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction of felony escape from the
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that convicting someone of a "serious crime" such as a felony, without
requiring some type of criminal intent, would deprive that person of his or
her liberty without due process of law.9' The policy behind this rule was
to prevent criminal liability for accidental or innocent behavior.2 Chief
Justice Boney explained that due process necessitated an awareness of
one's behavior and the specific acts being committed, but not an
understanding that such acts violated the law.93 The Alex court also based
its rationale on Morissette, maintaining that Morissette and Speidel
require that serious crimes include at least "a general criminal intent as
opposed to strict criminal liability which applies regardless of intention. '9 4
Thus, the principles set forth in Speidel and Alex reflect Alaska's
interpretation of the meaning of the Morissette Court's general guidelines
concerning the necessity of culpable mental state elements.
The court reaffirmed the above principles in Kimoktoak v. State,95
indicating that due process requires mens rea elements for serious crimes.96
The defendant was convicted of the statutory offense of failing to render
aid to someone he had struck with a motor vehicle. 7 Relying on Speidel,
Alex and Morissette, the court found that the statute in question was
facially unconstitutional for not requiring that an accused possess criminal
intent (i.e., the knowledge of failing to render aid). 8  Although the
defendant argued that courts could read intent requirements only into
statutes codifying common law crimes, the court ruled that Speidel and
Morissette did not preclude courts from inferring criminal intent
requirements into statutes creating new offenses.99 Thus, rather than
invalidating the failure-to-aid statute, the court read a knowledge
requirement into the statute.'0°
The Speidel, Alex and Kimoktoak opinions evidence the firmly
entrenched due process requirement that an element of criminal intent must
exist for serious crime convictions. These opinions set the stage for Alaska
facility where he already was serving a criminal sentence. Id. at 677, 686. The court found
that the jury instructions required a finding of intentional conduct and awareness, and
therefore achieved Speidel's mental state requirements. Id. at 682.
91. Id. at 680-81; see Speidel, 460 P.2d at 80.
92. Alex, 484 P.2d at 681.
93. Id. at 681-82.
94. Id. at 681.
95. 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978).
96. Id. at 29.
97. Id. at 27.
98. Id. at 29.
99. Id. at 28-30.
100. Id. at 31.
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to consider whether due process requires the inclusion of mens rea for
statutory rape, and suggests an answer in the affirmative.
C. Alaska Has Extended Due Process to Require Mens Rea for Sexual
Abuse of a Minor Convictions
In the landmark case of State v. Guest,1°1 the Alaska Supreme Court
first determined that due process requires that statutory rape include a
mens rea requirement. The court declared that the state could not convict
a defendant of statutory rape if that defendant reasonably believed that the
person he or she had sexual intercourse with was sixteen years of age or
older.1 2 In the court's decision, Justice Matthews explained that Alex,
Speidel and Kimolctoak had held "that it would be a deprivation of
liberty without due process to convict a person of a serious crime without
the requirement of criminal intent.' ' " The court explained that to refuse
a mistake of age defense to statutory rape would violate this constitutional
principle, as defendants with no criminal intent would be convicted."
Based on due process, Justice Matthews reasoned that where the particular
felony statute does not explicitly require intent and "is not a public welfare
type of offense, either a requirement of criminal intent must be read into
the statute, or it must be found unconstitutional. ''la5 Holding that the case
did not come within the public welfare exception, the court read a culpable
mental state requirement into Alaska's statutory rape statute. The court did
not explicitly address who should bear the burden of proving the defense
of honest and reasonable mistake as to the victim's age."
The statutory rape statute involved in Guest has since been revised.
Nevertheless, the Guest holding applies to the current crime of second
degree sexual abuse of a minor. The Guest court used the phrase
"statutory rape" because the statute at issue included the offense of sexual
intercourse with a person under sixteenY This action would now be
referred to as sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, provided the
perpetrator was three years older than the victim.108 The former statute and
the current statute involve almost identical conduct,"' 9 and second degree
101. 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
102. Id. at 839.
103. Id. at 838.
104. Id. at 838-39.
105. Id. at 839.
106. Id. at 839-40.
107. See infra note 109.
108. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.436 (a)(1)-(2), (b) (1989). If the victim was under the age
of 13, the same action would constitute first degree sexual abuse. Id. § 11.41.434.
109. The statutory rape provision in effect at the time of the Guest decision and prior
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sexual abuse of a minor constitutes a felony punishable by a substantial
prison sentence. ° Therefore, the current sexual abuse of a minor offense
must also be considered a "serious crime" triggering the due process
requirements of Alex and its progeny. The language in Guest suggests
that due process requires some form of criminal intent for all serious
crimes in Alaska, including, but not limited to, statutory rape."'
In Jager v. State," the Alaska Court of Appeals suggested that
Alaska's reasonable belief affirmative defense prevented strict criminal
liability for sexual abuse of a minor from violating due process. The
Jager court ruled that Guest's holding did not apply to Alaska's sexual
abuse of a minor statute.' In the Jager opinion, Chief Judge Bryner
asserted that the Guest court had inferred "a requirement of criminal intent
in order to avoid the imposition of strict criminal liability for an offense
not involving the public welfare."" 4 Judge Bryner explained that the
language in Guest no longer applied because the legislature had provided
for a reasonable belief affirmative defense to second degree sexual abuse
of a minor."5
Under this reasoning, the legislative creation of an affirmative defense
of reasonable belief of age precluded the imposition of strict liability in
to the 1978 revisions of the Alaska Criminal Code provided that: "a person who ... (2)
being 16 years of age or older, carnally knows and abuses a person under 16 years of age,
is guilty of rape." Guest, 583 P.2d at 837 n.1 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.120 (19 6)
(repealed 1978)). Note that the statutory rape provision that was repealed when the Alaska
Criminal Code was revised in 1978 is very similar to the definition of sexual abuse of a
minor in the current Alaska Criminal Code. In fact, the only differences are that the current
statute: (1) uses the term "sexual penetration" in place of "caral knowledge"; (2) classifies
sexual penetration as filrst degree sexual abuse when the victim is under 13 years of age and
second degree sexual abuse when the victim is 13 or older;, and (3) specifies that the
offender must be at least three years older than the victim. Compare ALASKA STAT. §
11.15.120 (1976) (repealed 1978) with ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434-.436 (1989 & Supp.
1991).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9. lager v. State, 748 P.2d 1172 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1988), provides an example or a prison sentence for someone convicted of second
degree sexual abuse of a minor. The court affirmed a sentence of four years imprisonment
with three years suspended. Id. at 1173.
111. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. Justice Matthews' concurring
opinion in State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981), however, casts some doubt on this
proposition. In Rice, Justice Matthews recommended requiring a culpable mental state
whenever imprisonment may result, but admitted that Alaska had not yet held so
unconditionally. Id. at 115 (Matthews, J., concurring). Although the Guest court required
a mens rea element for statutory rape and justified this requirement in part on the fact that
statutory rape was a serious crime, the author of the Guest opinion acknowledged that
Alaska has not yet mandated criminal intent elements for every offense punishable by a
prison sentence.
112. 748 P.2d 1172 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
113. Id. at 1178.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1177-78 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445(b) (1989)). For a discussion
of this affirmative defense statute, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Jager. Absent strict liability, there is no unconstitutionality to be resolved
by the courts.
If the defendant has the opportunity to prove a lack of intent sufficient
for exoneration, does the crime remain a strict liability offense? Without
support or justification, the Jager court assumed a negative answer to this
question, and improperly equated the inclusion of a mens rea element in
Guest to the availability of an affirmative defense in Jager, insofar as
those principles cure strict liability. "Curing" strict liability means, in
essence, giving effect to due process safeguards.116 The inclusion of a
mens rea requirement and the provision of an affirmative defense are not
equal vis-a-vis preserving due process guarantees. Providing an affirmative
defense will not always cure an unconstitutional strict liability statute if it
remains possible for the prosecution to convict a defendant without
demonstrating any criminal intent. Since that possibility exists, an
affirmative defense fails to adequately cure strict liability, and Jager was
wrongly decided. Due process requires that the prosecution prove a
culpable mental state to convict a defendant of sexual abuse of a minor.
The Guest court stated that denying an accused the chance "to show
that he lacked criminal intent. . .. [would result in] strict criminal
liability." 7 One might infer from the use of the word "show" that no
strict liability occurs if the law allows a defendant to prove a lack of intent.
However, "show" is not synonymous with "prove." A homicide defendant
generally has the right to "show" that she did not pull the trigger, yet the
prosecution retains the burden of proof on that issue.
In contrast, the prosecution has no burden of proving intent for
Alaska's sexual abuse of a minor offense. Unless the accused proves
reasonable belief of age by apreponderance of the evidence, the state could
convict a defendant of this serious crime without any showing that the
accused knew or was even negligent in not knowing that he or she had
sexual intercourse with a person under the statutory age. Because the
Guest court declared that due process prohibits strict criminal liability for
statutory rape, due process requires that the prosecution prove a culpable
mental state beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant of sexual
abuse of a minor. Forcing defendants to negate such a mental state via an
affirmative defense fails to afford defendants their constitutionally-
guaranteed due process rights.'
116. See Guest, 583 P.2d at 838. The Alaska Supreme Court's decisions in Alex, Speidel
and Kimoktoak indicate "that it would be a deprivation of liberty without due process to
convict a person of a serious crime without the requirement of criminal intent." Id.
117. Id. at 838-39 (emphasis added).
118. State v. E3lton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984), is one example of a court that took this
approach to the need to cure strict liability. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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D. The Unconstitutionality of Alaska's Affirmative Defense Statute
Since sexual abuse of a minor in Alaska requires a culpable mental
state, or mens rea, Winship demands that the prosecution retain the burden
of proving this fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 The Alaska Legislature
violated federal due process by shifting the burden of proving a reasonable
belief of age to the defendant.1 Alaska courts have no choice but to
recognize and apply Winship's law, and they have done so on numerous
occasions."' The Guest decision, combined with the principles
announced in Winship, renders the reasonable belief of age affirmative
defense statute unconstitutional."
The limitation placed on Winship by the Patterson v. New York3
opinion does not affect Winship's application to Guest. As explained
above, the Patterson court maintained that due process compels the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime, but not to disprove
affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt"U The issue of whether
Patterson allows Alaska to burden the defendant with proving a
reasonable belief of age defense hinges on the proper interpretation of
Guest. The Guest court's inference of a culpable mental state
requirement for statutory rape appears equivalent to requiring negligence
as a mens rea element for that type of offense. In Hentzner v.
State, 12 the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation of Guest.
Justice Matthews, the author of the Guest opinion, explained that the court
"construed the statute involved in Guest to include criminal intent as an
element of the offense proscribed in order to avoid finding the statute
unconstitutional." 1 Therefore, even under Patterson, the prosecution
must bear the burden of proving the mental state.
119. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Smallwood v. State, 781 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (citing
Winsh'p in holding that the court plainly erred in taking judicial notice of an element of the
charge); Howard v. State, 583 PR.d 827, 833 (Alaska 1978) (citing Winship in holding that
the state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that property taken in larceny
belongs to another).
122. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445(b) (1989). The argument that due process
necessitates a mens rea element for sexual abuse of a minor and requires that the
prosecution bear the burden of proving this issue would also logically apply to sexual abuse
of a minor in the first degree, where the victim is younger than 13 years old. Obviously,
it would be much easier for the prosecution to show that the defendant had reason to know
that the victim was less than 16 years old when the victim is actually younger than 13 years
old, but one could argue that the possibility of a reasonable belief still exists.
123. 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
124. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210; see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
125. 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980).
126. Id. at 827 (emphasis added).
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It follows from Patterson that the defendant may only be forced to
sustain the burden of proof on defenses that rebut an element of the
crime.127 Offering an affirmative defense option instead of reading amens
rea element into a crime fails even Patterson's low threshold due process
standard. It does so by assigning the defendant the burden of proof on an
issue that, under Alaska's due process, is an element of the crime.
VI. CONSIERING THE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
A. The Guest Footnote
One argument against the proposal that Alaska constitutionally require
a mens rea element as to the age of a statutory rape victim derives from the
Guest court's citation of the revised affirmative defense statute. Alaska
Statutes section 11.45.445,'2 later referred to by the Jager court, was not
in effect at the time of Guest. However, the Guest court cited the draft
of this statute, which made reasonable belief in the age of the victim an
affirmative defense to sexual abuse of a minor, as an example of the type
of defense that the Guest court allowed.129 Why would the court cite a
future statute in an opinion that has the effect of rendering that statute
unconstitutional? One could assume that Justice Matthews and the Guest
court had Alaska's upcoming affirmative defense statute in mind when
allowing a reasonable belief of age defense to statutory rape. If so, the
court probably never intended to permanently affix a mens rea element to
the actions included in statutory rape and later in sexual abuse of a minor
offenses. Instead, Guest might stand for the proposition that due process
prohibits the conviction of a defendant for a statutory rape-type offense
unless the defendant has an opportunity to demonstrate a lack of awareness
of the facts. In other words, the court may have believed that an
affirmative defense cures strict liability. Therefore, even if the statutory
rape statute in Guest did require a mental element, the sexual abuse of a
minor statute, with its corresponding affirmative defense, would not.
127. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
128. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
129. The court stated that:
Several states, by statute, have recognized [a reasonable mistake of age] defense.
... This point of view has also been adopted by the 1978 revisors of the Alaska
Criminal Code. Alaska Criminal Code revision (effective 1980) provides ...
[that] whenever a provision of law defining an offense depends upon a victim's
being under a certain age, it is an affirmative defense that... the defendant
reasonably believed the victim to be that age or older, unless the victim was under
13 years of age at the time of the offense.
State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 838 n.2 (Alaska 1978).
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Nevertheless, the citation of the affirmative defense statute by the
Guest court does not undermine the thesis of this note for two reasons.
First; the above counter-argument must assume that the citation of the
affirmative defense statute proves that the court concluded that the statute
cures strict liability. As previously explained, however, an affirmative
defense of a lack of mens rea cannot logically cure strict liability because
ajury may still convict an accused without any showing of mens reaby the
prosecution."3 The possibility that the Guest court disregarded this logic
and improperly believed that an affirmative defense cured the strict liability
problem is unlikely. Most courts which have allowed only a reasonable
belief affirmative defense for statutory rape have accepted such a defense
based on policy rather than considerations of due process.' A more likely
possibility is that the court simply reached no conclusion at all. The
opinion refers to the statute only in a footnote, as part of a list of examples
of states recognizing reasonable belief defenses. 32 The court expressed no
opinion as to who bore the burden of proof of the reasonable belief
defense, and probably never considered the constitutional issues deriving
from assigning defendants the burden of proving this type of defense. If
the court had considered these issues, the plain meaning of Guest's
language, including such phrases as "requirement of criminal intent' and
"element of the offense," would have forced the court to warn that
Alaska's future statute violated due process.
Second, any inconsistency raised by the court's citation of the
affirmative defense statute pales when compared with the rest of the Guest
opinion. The court developed a detailed argument in which it described a
line of prior due process opinions, discussed the strict liability problems
with failing to require some kind of mental state as to the age of the victim
in statutory rape, and concluded that due process mandated that the court
infer a criminal intent element for statutory rape.'3 This argument
constituted the bulk of the opinion and clearly indicates the court's intent.
In order to find the affirmative defense statute constitutional, the Alaska
Supreme Court would have to retract much of the language and many of
the principles set forth in Guest, Alex, Speidel and Kimoktoak. The
130. See supra discussion at pp. 31-32.
131. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249, 251 (N.M. 1990) (allowing a reasonable
belief of age affirmative defense while refraining from classifying knowledge of age as an
element of the offense). The one court that did specifically rely on due process principles
decided that more than an affirmative defense was needed to cure strict liability. State v.
Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984), see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
132. Guest, 583 P.2d at 838 n.2.
133. Id. at 839.
134. Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 827 (1980) (citing Guest, 583 P.2d at 839).
135. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
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court could no longer maintain that due process requires a culpable mental
state element for serious crimes such as sexual abuse of a minor. Thus,
even if the court's citation of the affirmative defense statute is inconsistent
with the remainder of the opinion, it does not substantially affect the
strength of that opinion
B. The "Unrealistic" Argument
A second counter-argument is that Alaska's requirement of a mens rea
element for sexual abuse of a minor is unrealistic. Under Alaska standards,
a culpable mental state element requirement would cause the statutory rape
law in most states to violate due process, as states tend either to not permit
a reasonable belief of age defense or to allow such a defense but place the
burden of proof on the defendant.
Alaska has taken a comparatively drastic step in allowing such a
defense for sexual abuse of a minor only because the Alaska Supreme
Court has held that due process precludes severe punishment for crimes
lacking a required mens rea element Most states have not taken this step
in their due process jurisprudence. For instance, Nebraska's explicit refusal
to broaden due process served as a basis for rejecting a reasonable belief
of age defense. In State v. Vicars,'3 the Nebraska Supreme Court
declared that no specific intent as to age was required for statutory rape.1
The court reasoned that "cast[ing] upon the public the duty of care or
extreme caution," by not requiring criminal intent, did not violate due
process." Similarly, although New Mexico has allowed a defense of
reasonable mistake of a victim's age, it has not extended due process as far
as Alaska. In Perez v. State,139 the New Mexico Supreme Court
explained:
We recognize the increased maturity and independence of today's
teenagers and, while we do not hold that knowledge of the victim's age is
an element of the offense, we do hold that under the facts of this case the
defendant should have been allowed to present his defense of mistake of
fact.140
The court did not resort to due process as a basis for this new defense.
Considering the limitations other states have placed on due process
rights, the claim that Alaska defies the law of the overwhelming majority
of states by requiring that the prosecution prove lack of reasonable belief
136. 183 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Neb. 1971).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 803 P.2d 249 (N.M. 1990).
140. Id. at 251.
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of age does not seem so outlandish. The basis for Alaska's minority
position lies in recognizing that Alaska actually has - permissibly --
extended its constitutional due process protections further than have other
states.
C. Bell v. State
A third argument against the thesis that Alaska should require the
prosecution to prove that the defendant was at least negligent with regard
to knowing the age of the victim in statutory rape derives from the holding
in Bell v. State.141 In Bell, the Alaska Court of Appeals found that
mistake of age did not constitute a defense, affirmative or otherwise, to the
crime of promoting the prostitution of a minor.'42 This ruling can be
distinguished from Guest, as the Bell court reasoned that specific intent
was not required for crimes where the criminal intent for a lesser included
offense does exist 143 Since the defendant knew he was promoting
prostitution, itself a crime, his intent could be transferred to satisfy the
mens rea required for promoting the prostitution of a minor, a more serious
crime arising from the same act. In contrast, since fornication is not an
enforced criminal offense,'" the same rationale cannot be used to eliminate
the necessity of a mental state for sexual abuse of a minor in the first or
second degree.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1978, the Alaska Supreme Court moved forward in an area that the
United States Supreme Court has avoided. The Guest court faced the
issue of whether due process requires a mens rea element for a serious
crime such as statutory rape; that court held that such crimes do require a
culpable mental state. Three years later, the Hentzner court affirmed that
the Guest ruling did require a mens rea element for statutory rape. Today,
Alaska statutes define actions that previously comprised the crime of
"statutory rape" as sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree. The
crime still constitutes a felony that is punishable by a prison sentence, and
clearly represents an example of a serious crime. Since the Alaska
Constitution demands a mens rea element for "statutory rape," renaming
that action by statute should not eliminate the constitutional requirement.
Since mens rea (negligence, recklessness, knowledge or purpose as to
141. 668 P.2d 829 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
142. Id. at 832-33.
143. Id. at 834-35.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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having sexual relations with someone under sixteen) exists as an element
of sexual abuse of a minor, established United States Supreme Court and
Alaska Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that the prosecution must
retain the burden of proving the mental state. The requirement of a mens
rea element for sexual abuse of a minor compels: (1) the recognition that
Alaska's affirmative defense statute for reasonable belief in the age of the
victim is unconstitutional; and (2) the rejection of the Jager decision.
Unless the due process principles recognized in Alex, Speidel and
Kimoktoak, and elaborated on in Guest, are to be sacrificed and
abandoned, Alaska must declare Alaska Statutes section 11.41.445 in its
current form void and unconstitutional as a deprivation of due process
rights.
Benjamin L. Reiss
